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Abstract—Malicious mobile phone worms spread between
devices via short-range Bluetooth contacts, similar to the prop-
agation of human and other biological viruses. Recent work
has employed models from epidemiology and complex networks
to analyse the spread of malware and the effect of patching
specific nodes. These approaches have adopted a static view
of the mobile networks, i.e., by aggregating all the edges that
appear over time, which leads to an approximate representation
of the real interactions: instead, these networks are inherently
dynamic and the edge appearance and disappearance are
highly influenced by the ordering of the human contacts,
something which is not captured at all by existing complex
network measures.
In this paper we first study how the blocking of mal-
ware propagation through immunisation of key nodes (even
if carefully chosen through static or temporal betweenness
centrality metrics) is ineffective: this is due to the richness
of alternative paths in these networks. Then we introduce a
time-aware containment strategy that spreads a patch message
starting from nodes with high temporal closeness centrality and
show its effectiveness using three real-world datasets. Temporal
closeness allows the identification of nodes able to reach most
nodes quickly: we show that this scheme reduces the cellular
network resource consumption and associated costs, achieving,
at the same time, complete containment of malware in a limited
amount of time.
Keywords-Mobile Malware; Temporal Graphs; Temporal
Centrality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smartphones are not only ubiquitous, but also an essential
part of life for many people who carry such devices through
their daily routine. It comes at no surprise then that recent
studies have shown that the mobility of such devices mimic
that of their owners’ schedule [8], [23]. This fact constitutes
an opportunity for devising efficient protocols and appli-
cations, but it also represents an increasing security risk:
as with biological viruses that can spread from person to
person, mobile phone viruses can also leverage the same
social contact patterns to propagate via short-range wireless
radio such as Bluetooth and WiFi. For example, when secu-
rity researchers downloaded Cabir [1] – a proof-of-concept
mobile worm – for analysis, they discovered the full risk as
it broke loose, replicating from the test device to external
mobile phones. This prompted the need for specially radio
shielded rooms to securely test such malicious code [13].
Until recently though, mobile malware has been devel-
oped only for proof-of-concept experiments with very lim-
ited and non malicious effects on users [20], [18]. However,
the immense popularity and improvements in smartphone
technology have attracted the attention of a growing number
of attackers. In particular, increasing economic incentives
have been the motivation of more recent exploits, for ex-
ample stealing private data such as phone contacts [2];
transferring call credit to other accounts [3]; and traditional
exploits such as premium rate number dialling [4].
Unlike desktop computers mobile malware can spread
through both short-range radio (i.e., Bluetooth and WiFi)
and long-range communication (i.e., SMS, MMS and
email) [14]. Long-range malicious traffic can potentially
be contained by the network operator by scanning every
message against a database of known malware [17], how-
ever, short-range propagation might fall under the radar of
centralised service providers: effective schemes to defend
against short-range mobile malware spreading are necessary.
Also, while a global patching of the devices through cellular
connectivity is the natural solution and is in theory possible,
in practice, there are potential constraints with respect to the
cellular network capacity and server bandwidth [9].
Being highly correlated with human contacts, understand-
ing how such malware propagates requires an accurate
analysis of the underlying time-varying network of contacts
amongst individuals. State-of-the-art solutions on mobile
malware containment have ignored two important temporal
properties: firstly, the time order, frequency and duration of
contacts; and secondly, the time of day a malicious message
starts to spread and the delay of a patch [26], [27]. Instead,
we argue that the temporal dimension is of key importance
in devising effective solutions to this problem.
With this in mind, the focus of this study is to investigate
the effectiveness of two containment strategies based on tar-
getting key nodes, taking into account these temporal charac-
teristics. We firstly investigate a traditional strategy, inspired
by studies on error and attack tolerance of networks [5],
exploiting a static and a time-aware enhanced version of
betweenness centrality which provide the best measure of
nodes that mediate or bridge the most communication flows.
According to this strategy the nodes that act as mediators are
patched to block the path of a malicious message. However,
due to temporal clustering and alternative temporal paths,
in most cases, such strategies merely slow the malware and
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does not stop it. In other words, a scheme based solely on
immunisation of key nodes is not sufficient, instead quick
spreading of the patch is necessary for most networks. We
propose a solution based on local spreading of patches
through Bluetooth, i.e., exploiting the same mechanism used
by the malware itself. The key issue in this approach is
to select the right nodes as starting points of the patching
process. Temporal betweenness only provides a quantitative
measure of the number of communication paths over time
that go through a certain node and it proves to be sub-optimal
metric for this. A metric capable of identifying nodes that
can reach a large quantity of other nodes quickly is needed.
Our choice fell on temporal closeness centrality which ranks
nodes by the speed at which they can disseminate a message
to all other nodes in the network. We show that this strategy
can reduce the cellular network resource consumption and
associated costs, achieving at the same time a complete
containment of the malware in a limited amount of time.
In the following sections, we will first introduce some
preliminary definitions related to temporal graph analysis
and metrics and then present a detailed study of our proposed
containment scheme using real-world traces.
II. TEMPORAL NETWORKS
Temporal graphs have recently been proposed [21], [11]
to study real dynamic datasets, with the intuition that the
behaviour of dynamic networks can be more accurately
captured by a sequence of snapshots of the network topology
as it changes over time instead of using a representation
whereby all the contacts are aggregated into a single static
graph. From this, temporal versions of shortest path [21]
have demonstrated that, since static analysis ignores time
ordering of contacts, static shortest paths overestimate the
available links and underestimate the actual shortest path
length.
We now provide a brief overview of these concepts
in relation to the problem of designing effective malware
containment schemes. Since Bluetooth radio can only handle
uni-directional transmissions (from the scanning device to
the scanned device) we define a directed temporal graph
which can be thought of as an ordered sequence of directed
graphs1. A state of the network topology is calculated
by aggregating all the directed edges that appear inside
a certain time window. An example, using a dataset of
contacts among students and staff at Cambridge, is given
in Figure 1 (more details about the dataset are provided in
Section IV-A)2: Figure 1(a) shows a temporal graph with
a sequence of six graphs, each of them representing the
contacts among devices in a time window of 24-hours. The
corresponding aggregated static graph (which reports all the
links amongst nodes, without any information about time) is
1This does not lose generality of bi-directional communication since
transmissions can still be reciprocated during the same encounter.
2Direction of edges have been removed for clarity.
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Figure 1. (a) Temporal Graph showing contacts using 24-hour windows
and (b) aggregated static graph for the CAMBRIDGE dataset. Nodes
represent devices; two nodes are linked if there was a Bluetooth contact
within that 24-hour window.
shown in Figure 1(b). The static graph misses the circadian
rhythms that can instead be observed in the temporal graph.
Also note that the high density of links within the static
graph, which we will see later, contributes to problems in
discriminating between important nodes for the calculation
of static centrality; instead a temporal graph is required
to capture the rich temporal information of the interaction
patterns.
To give an intuition as to why temporal graphs and
temporal paths are necessary, consider the temporal graph
and associated aggregated static graph in Figure 2. If we
consider a shortest path from node A to F , according to
the static graph there is a 2-hop path (A,C, F ), when in
fact taking into account the time ordering of contacts in
the temporal graph, we see that such a path does not exist
in reality; instead, the actual shortest path is of 3-hops
(A,C,E, F ).
More formally, given a real-world contact trace starting
at tmin and ending at tmax, the directed temporal graph
Gw(tmin, tmax) is defined as the ordered sequence of graphs
(G0, G2, . . . , GT−1) where T = ((tmax − tmin)/w) =
|Gw(tmin, tmax)| is the number of graphs in the sequence
and w is the size of each time window expressed in some
time units (e.g., seconds or hours). There exists a directed
link from i to j in GT if there is a contact from i to j during
the time interval [(tmin+(w×T )), (tmin+(w×(T +1)))).
All graphs in the temporal graph have the same set of nodes
V .
From this a temporal path starting at i and finishing at
j can be defined over Gw(tmin, tmax) as a sequence of k
hops via a distinct node nWkk at time window Wk:
phij = (n
W0
1 , . . . , n
Wk
k ) (1)
where i = n1, j = nk, node nk is passed a message at
time window Wk ≥ Wk−1, 0 ≤ Wk < T and h is the
maximum hops through which a message is replicated within
the same window. Subsequent definitions implicitly set h =
1, since higher values of h lead to similar performance of
the containment schemes. We call Qij the set of all temporal
paths between nodes i and j. If a temporal path from i to j
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Figure 2. Example directed Temporal and aggregated static graph.
does not exist i.e. Qij = ∅, we say that (i, j) is a temporally
disconnected node pair, and we set the distance dij =∞.
Using the function D(pij) = (w×Wk) which returns the
real delivery time (at window Wk) for the given path relative
to tmin, the shortest temporal path length is defined as:
dij = min(D(qij)),∀qij ∈ Qij (2)
From this we define the set Sij of shortest temporal paths
between i, j as:
Sij = {pij ∈ Qij | D(pij) = dij} (3)
We define the temporal efficiency Eij between nodes i
and j for the time interval tmin to tmax as:
Eij(tmin, tmax) =
1
dij(tmin, tmax) + 1
(4)
We can then define the average temporal efficiency E as:
E(tmin, tmax) =
1
N(N − 1)
∑
i,j∈V
i 6=j
Eij(tmin, tmax) (5)
For brevity we shall also refer to this as efficiency. Efficiency
naturally handles disconnected node pairs since it gives us
the harmonic mean of delays between all node pairs.
III. TEMPORAL CENTRALITY METRICS FOR MALWARE
CONTAINMENT
Let us consider a simple scenario where a person receives
a malicious message on their device in the early hours of
the morning and the malicious program replicates itself to
any devices it meets during the day, for example at work
and while socialising in the evening.
A simple strategy consists of immunising only the nodes
which mediate the most communication flows. Betweenness
centrality metrics have been devised for static complex
network graphs to measure this quantity [24] and we have
extended this measure to incorporate the temporal dimen-
sion [22]. However, we will show that no matter how we
choose these nodes (e.g., by using a static or temporal met-
rics to find these path mediators), this strategy is ineffective.
The intuition behind this is given through the example in
Figure 2. Consider the shortest temporal paths from node A
to node F , namely (A,C,E, F ) and a longer (both in terms
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Figure 3. (a) Two temporal paths from A to F . (b) Temporal minimum
spanning tree with source A and shortest temporal paths to all other nodes.
of hops and time of delivery) temporal path (A,B,D,E, F ),
also illustrated in Figure 3(a). If we consider the simple case
of patching a single node in an attempt to block the malware
from spreading, the best choice would be node C, as the
one on most temporal paths, however notice that node B
provides an alternative path to F albeit a longer path.
Our second strategy relies on the ability to spread a patch
message quickly throughout the network; we utilise close-
ness centrality which is able to capture this property. We
now formally describe these temporal centrality measures.
A. Temporal Betweenness Centrality
The static betweenness centrality of a node i is defined
as the fraction of shortest paths between all pairs of nodes
which pass through i [24]. Betweenness is commonly used
to discover nodes which are critical for information flow
and, therefore, prioritised for patching. Hence, to capture
the notion of temporal betweenness it is important to take
into account not only the number of shortest paths which
pass through a node, but also the length of time for which
a node along the shortest path retains a malicious mes-
sage before forwarding it to the next node. For example,
consider the 2-hop shortest temporal path from node A
to D, (A,B,D). In terms of time, this path could be
represented as (A,B,B,B,D) since the malicious message
resides on node B for 3 time windows, and so we want to
assign a higher value as patching this node will lead to a
higher probability of stopping the malicious message from
spreading. From this, for a given time window T we define
the temporal betweenness centrality of node i as:
Bi(T ) = 1
(N − 1)(N − 2)
∑
j∈V
j 6=i
∑
k∈V
k 6=i
k 6=j
U(i, T, j, k)
|σj,k(i)| (6)
where the function U returns the number of shortest tempo-
ral paths from j to k in which node i has either received a
message at time window T or is holding a message from a
past time window until the next node is met at some time
T ′ > T and σj,k(i) ⊆ Sjk is the set of shortest temporal
paths from node i to j which pass through node i, defined
when σj,k(i) 6= ∅. In the case when σj,k(i) = ∅, i.e., node i
is totally isolated, we set its betweenness to zero. Finally, the
average temporal betweenness value across all time windows
for each node i is:
Bi = 1
T
T−1∑
t=0
Bi(t). (7)
CAMBRIDGE INFOCOM MIT
N 18 78 100
Start Date 3 Feb 2010 23 Apr 2006 26 Jul 2004
Duration 10 Days 5 days 280 days
Scanning Rate 30 sec 2 min 5 min
Table I
EXPERIMENTAL DATASETS
B. Temporal Closeness Centrality
Two nodes of a static graph are said to be close to each
other if their geodesic distance is small. In a static graph an
estimation of the global closeness of a node i is obtained
as the average static shortest path length to all other nodes
in the graph [24]. Similarly, we can extend the definition
of closeness to temporal graphs using the temporal shortest
path length between nodes, which is a measure of how fast a
source node can deliver a message to all the other nodes of
the network. This can be thought of as a temporal minimum
spanning tree (see Figure 3(b)). Given the shortest temporal
distance dij(tmin, tmax), temporal closeness centrality can
then be expressed as:
Ci(tmin, tmax) = 1−
 1
W (N − 1)
∑
j 6=i∈V
di,j(tmin, tmax)

(8)
so that nodes that have, on average, shorter temporal dis-
tances to the other nodes are considered more central.
Note that the subtraction from one is only required for a
descending ranking.
C. Runtime Complexity
Calculating temporal all pairs shortest path has a time
complexity of O(N3T ). Since temporal closeness only
requires summing across all destination nodes and temporal
betweenness only requires an additional summation across
all time windows, the asymptotic complexity is the same.
D. Designing a Time-aware Containment Scheme
We now discuss the potential alternative designs of time-
aware containment schemes which utilise temporal centrality
measures to find the best node for patching.
1) Exploiting Temporal Betweeness Centrality to Block
the Paths of Mobile Malware: By definition, temporal be-
tweenness centrality finds nodes which mediate between the
most communication channels and, hence, their removal will
have the greatest impact on the network overall communica-
tion efficiency. It follows that the first containment scheme
can utilise this information to send a patch to these mediating
devices, blocking a malicious message from using paths
which pass through these devices. As already mentioned,
we will show in Section IV-D that such a scheme is not
effective due to many alternative paths which exist in real
human contact traces. The presence of these alternative paths
is due to social clusters during the day which requires a high
number of nodes to be patched in order to stop and contain
the malware.
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Figure 4. Temporal efficiency (y-axis) as a function of time (x-axis). Note
the logarithmic y-axis.
2) Exploiting Temporal Closeness Centrality to Spread a
Competitive Patch: An alternative scheme can be based on
the selection of the best devices to start spreading a patch
message; the intuition is that a patch message, if started at
the right device(s), can propagate faster than the malicious
message. Closeness centrality fits this specification since it
ranks nodes by their ability to spread a message quickly to
the most nodes. We will show in Section IV-E that such a
scheme is indeed effective.
IV. EVALUATION
A. Experimental Datasets
To evaluate the time-aware mobile malware containment
schemes, three traces of real mobile device contacts carried
by humans are used: Bluetooth traces of researchers at the
University of Cambridge, Computer Laboratory, as part of
an emotion sensing experiment [16]; Bluetooth traces of
participants at the 2006 INFOCOM conference [19]; and
campus Bluetooth traces of students and staff at MIT [8].
We shall refer to these as CAMBRIDGE, INFOCOM, MIT,
respectively. Table I describes the characteristics of each set
of traces. All three datasets were constructed from mobile
device co-location where participants were given Bluetooth
enabled mobile devices to carry around. When two devices
come into communication range of the Bluetooth radio, the
device logs the colocation with the other device. For the
CAMBRIDGE dataset, all 10 days are used as part of the
evaluation. For the INFOCOM dataset, since devices were
not handed out to participants until late afternoon during the
first day, only the last 4 days are used. For the MIT dataset,
we show results for the first two weeks of the Fall semester3
representing a typical fortnight of activity.
B. Simulation Setup
We evaluate the design space of a time-aware containment
scheme through a trace-driven simulation using as input
3http://web.mit.edu/registrar/www/calendar0405.html
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Figure 5. INFOCOM day 4: Immunising 1 (top left) & 10 source nodes
(top right). Area under curves shown in the legend. Area (bottom left) and
final % of infected nodes (bottom right), as we increase the % of nodes
immunised (x-axis).
the three datasets described above. We will examine the
effects of four key factors: the starting time of the malware
spreading process tm and of the corresponding patching time
tp, the initial number of the infected nodes Nm and the
initial number of patched nodes Np. The top Np devices
are chosen according to the calculated temporal betweenness
or temporal closeness centrality ranking from the temporal
graph Gw(tp, tmax), where w is set to the finest window
granularity, corresponding to the scanning rate of the devices
in each dataset (e.g., 30 second windows for CAMBRIDGE).
The Nm nodes that are initially infected with malicious
messages are chosen uniformly randomly. The results are
obtained by averaging over 100 runs for each Np. The static
centralities from the static aggregated graph over the time
interval [tp, tmax] are also calculated for comparison.
Our evaluation is based on the following assumptions:
firstly, when a node receives a patch message, it is im-
munised for the rest of the simulation (i.e., we assume
that the malware does not mutate over time); secondly,
there is always a successful file transfer between devices
(errors in transmission can be taken into consideration in
the assessment of the contention scheme without changing
significantly the results of our work, assuming random
transmission failures); thirdly, an attacker chooses nodes at
random; and finally, we have no knowledge of which devices
are compromised (otherwise the best scheme is to patch
those devices immediately).
C. Effects of Time on Malware Spreading
Firstly, we briefly analyse the effects of the time of day
have on mobile malware propagation. Let us consider Fig-
ure 4 where we measure the temporal efficiency (Formula 5)
as a function of time. This sliding temporal efficiency is
calculated for all three datasets. As we can see there are
oscillations corresponding to the natural human periodic
daily and weekly behaviour. For example, the CAMBRIDGE
Figure 6. INFOCOM: Temporal clustering provide four types of alternative
paths: (A) inflowing paths to temporal cluster; (B) redundant nodes in
cluster; (C) alternative flows around temporal cluster; (D) many outflows
to next temporal cluster.
dataset is spread over 10 days, and it is apparent from the
traces that a (malicious) message can spread more efficiently
during the daytime, as opposed to evenings and weekends.
D. Non-Effectiveness of Betweenness based Patching
Starting from the results of the analysis of the effects time
of day has on message spreading, we now evaluate the best
case scenario for the containment scheme based on patching
nodes (without spreading the patch) and we show that this
is highly inefficient since it requires a very large number of
nodes to be patched via the cellular network to be effective.
Using Day 4 of the INFOCOM trace for this example,
a piece of malware is started at the beginning of the day
(tm=12am) and the device(s) are patched at the same time
(tp=12am). This is the best case scenario for two reasons:
first, the temporal graph in the morning is characterised by
low temporal efficiency since there are very few contacts,
therefore, the malware spreads slowly (as we have seen in
Figure 4); secondly, devices that are immunised immediately
have the best chance of blocking malware spreading routes.
Figure 5 shows the ratio of compromised devices across
time when the top 1 (top left panel) and top 10 (top
right panel) devices are patched after being selected using
betweenness and closeness. As we can see, temporal be-
tweenness initially performs better than static betweenness
and both temporal and static closeness (quantified by the
difference in the area under each curve, shown in the legend).
However, by 7am we observe a steep rise in the number
of compromised devices and by the end of the day, all
curves converge to the same point. We also note that in
both cases it is not possible to totally contain the malware,
suggesting that more devices need to be patched. Taking
a broader view, Figure 5 shows the area under the curve
(bottom left) and final ratio of nodes infected (bottom right)
as we increase the number of patched devices. Clearly,
even when the malware is started at the slowest time of
day for communication, we still need to patch 80% of the
devices before we can completely stop the malware from
spreading; this can be considered an impractically high
number of devices to patch. Similar high percentages are
also required in the MIT trace with a minimum of 45%
patched nodes. We can also conclude that in human contact
networks, even with blocked nodes, it is only a matter
of time before a (malicious) message disseminates to all
nodes. To understand the reason for the effectiveness of a
(malicious) message propagation, we take a visual analysis
approach: Figure 6 shows the temporal activity diagram4
for the INFOCOM experiment across all four days. This
gives a bird’s eye view of proximity between individuals as
they move between groups of colocated people across time,
where the trajectory of the same node is given by a straight
line. The horizontal axis is time and the vertical groupings of
nodes represents people that are in the same static connected
component such that there is a path between every node in
that cluster. The main feature to note is the temporal cluster
of remarkable size which appears from around 7am until
7pm every day, coinciding with the main activities at the
INFOCOM conference5. By means of this infographic, what
we see are periodic clusters of nodes during the daytime and
smaller disparate clusters during the evening. Figure 6 also
zooms into Day 4, highlighting the four types of activity
which give rise to temporal clustering and more importantly,
to alternative paths providing link redundancy for a message
to pass through a network over time. Since this strategy
cannot deal with these alternative paths effectively, the
propagation of a malicious message can merely be slowed
down. Hence, the rapid increase of infected nodes that can
be observed in Figure 5 around 7am can be attributed to
the presence of this large temporal cluster starting at 7am
where many alternative paths are present and, therefore, the
spreading cannot be stopped just patching some of the nodes.
We conclude that this containment strategy is not efficient
given the large number of patch messages it requires.
E. Effectiveness of Closeness based Patching (Worst Case
Scenario)
Since the blocking based containment scheme is not effec-
tive, we now evaluate the closeness based spreading scheme
with the aim of disseminating a patch message throughout
the network more quickly than a malicious message. We
start our analysis by examining a worst case scenario using
the CAMBRIDGE dataset: a researcher receives a malicious
message on their device in the early hours of Friday morning
(tm=Fri 12am) and the malicious program replicates itself
to any devices it meets during the day. A patch message
is started a day later to try patching all the compromised
4This plot was inspired by http://xkcd.com/657
5http://www.ieee-infocom.org/2006/technical program.htm
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devices (tp=Sat 12am). Again referring to Figure 4, this can
be considered as a worst case since the malware is started
during a day with high spreading efficiency and the patch is
delayed until the weekend when the efficiency is low.
Figure 7 shows the spreading rate for the malicious
message versus the best (left) and worst device (right) to
start the patching message. These results were obtained by
running simulations considering every single device as a
starting point of the patching process, and then ranking them
based on three performance metrics:
• the area under the curve (AUC), which captures the
behaviour of the infection over time with respect to the
number of infected devices6;
• the peak number of compromised devices (Imax);
• the time in days necessary to achieve total malware
containment (τ ).
Since the AUC captures both the Imax and τ , the best
and worst initial devices that were patched were selected
using the AUC. Comparing all three measures, the case
related to the selection of the worst device (right panel)
is characterised by double AUC (2.62 vs. 1.07); a higher
peak in compromised devices Imax (68% vs. 60%) and by
the fact that it is not possible to fully contain the malware
in a finite time τ (∞ vs. 3.3 days). Now comparing these
6The AUC is commonly used in epidemiology and medical trials [10].
CAMBRIDGE
0
1
2
AUC
0
4
8
12
τ
W
edTh
u Fr
i
Sa
t
Su
n
M
on Tu
e
W
edTh
u Fr
i0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
Imax
RAND
T Clos
S Clos
T Bet
S Bet
INFOCOM
0.0
0.5
1.0
AUC
1
2
3
4
τ
Da
y2
Da
y3
Da
y4
Da
y5
0.0
0.4
0.8
Imax
RAND
T Clos
S Clos
T Bet
S Bet
MIT
0
1
2
AUC
3
6
9
12
τ
Da
y0
Da
y1
Da
y2
Da
y3
Da
y4
Da
y5
Da
y6
Da
y7
Da
y8
Da
y9
Da
y1
0
Da
y1
1
Da
y1
2
Da
y1
3
0.0
0.2
0.4
Imax
RAND
T Clos
S Clos
T Bet
S Bet
Figure 10. Performance of temporal, static and naive node selection, across different malware start times (x-axis), averaged over all patch delays.
observations with centrality, in Figure 8 we observe that
the node characterised by the highest temporal closeness
centrality (ID=17) is also the optimal one for spreading
the patch and the node that leads to the worst performance
(ID=11) is ranked within the bottom two nodes. This should
be compared with static centrality which ranks the best
device to start the patching process (ID=17) in second place
and the worst device (ID=11) seventh from the bottom (not
shown). Also, the values of static centrality of each node is
more uniformly distributed; a fact which can be attributed to
the dense static graph previously observed in Figure 1. The
stronger correlation between temporal closeness centrality
and an effective malware containment scheme can be seen
more clearly by plotting these rankings against the AUC
in Figure 9. We expect a strong negative correlation since
centrality values are ranked in descending order; by using
temporal closeness centrality, we can identify the best node
to start disseminating a patch message to contain a piece
of mobile malware which fits our intuition that spreading a
patch message quickly is the best containment strategy.
F. Effects of Temporal Variability
Thus far we have only considered a single malware start
time. We now take a broader view and examine the effects
of varying malware start time (tm) and patch delay (tp). For
each dataset the AUC, Imax and τ are exhaustively calcu-
lated for different malware start times at hourly intervals
and increasing patch delays starting from zero (i.e., patch
messages start at the same time as malicious messages) to up
to 2 days. We compare node selection based on temporal and
static closeness to that of temporal and static betweenness.
As a baseline, a naive method of randomly selecting patching
nodes is also calculated, averaged over 100 runs.
1) Sensitivity to Malware Start Time: To understand the
effects of a malicious message starting at different times,
Figure 10 shows for each dataset the performance metrics
as a function of the malware start time tm, averaged over
all patch delays. Firstly, referring back to the temporal
efficiency from Figure 4, which exhibited daily peaks and
troughs during the weekend, the AUC and the maximum
number of infected nodes Imax tend to follow these same
patterns (strictly related to human circadian rhythms); how-
ever, the total time of containment (τ ) remains stable across
all start times. These results demonstrate that this time-aware
containment scheme is an effective method of quickly con-
taining malware, irrespective of when the malware started.
Now analysing the AUC and Imax, the temporal closeness
centrality curve is consistently lower than static closeness,
betweenness (both temporal and static) and naive methods.
Further, betweenness (both static and temporal) generally
take longer to fully contain the malware (higher values of
τ ) and static closeness centrality performs worse than the
naive method at some points of time; more specifically:
• For the CAMBRIDGE dataset, during the weekend a
static closeness method has a higher peak number of
compromised devices (Imax) than the naive method,
which shows that a static method is not effective at
slowing down the malware from spreading.
• For the INFOCOM dataset, again Imax is higher than
the naive method, during days 2 and 4. In addition, the
AUC curve for a static method peaks with temporal
efficiency during days 2, 4 and 5: this means that the
malware is not contained effectively in these scenarios.
Also, the total containment time (τ ) is greater than that
of the naive method during days 3, 4 and 5. This shows
that temporal closeness centrality is more consistent at
identifying the best nodes to start the patching process,
compared to both static and naive methods.
• Finally, for the MIT dataset, the naive method performs
extremely poorly (with high values of AUC, Imax and
τ across all malware start times), compared to either a
static or temporal methods. However, we also see that
during the first week of the Fall semester, temporal
closeness centrality identifies nodes with lower AUC
and τ , exhibiting over half a day quicker malware
containment compared to static closeness centrality.
2) Sensitivity to Patch Delay: To understand the effects
of delaying a patch message after a malware outbreak,
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Figure 11. Performance of temporal, static and naive node selection methods, as a function of patch delay (x-axis), averaged over all malware start times.
Figure 11 plots the performance metrics for a representative
sample of patch delays, averaged over all malware start
times. As the patch delay increases, all the performance
indicators also increase. However, we note that across all
three datasets, temporal closeness centrality (left most bar)
exhibits the best results: smallest AUC, fastest total con-
tainment time (τ ) and smallest peak compromised devices
(Imax). We also observe that in the INFOCOM dataset,
static closeness node selection gives higher values of Imax
and τ up to a 12 hour delay, showing that static centrality
does not consistently capture the true speed at which a
node can spread a message, compared to temporal closeness
centrality. Also, these plots demonstrate that betweenness
(both static and temporal) are not suited to a spreading
process and hence perform worse than closeness based node
selection. Again, from these observations, we conclude that a
containment scheme based on temporal closeness centrality
provides the best performance as the patch delay increases.
G. Impact of the Initial Number of Compromised and Patch-
ing Devices
We now look at the effects of starting malware messages
(Nm) and patch messages (Np) from more than one device.
This corresponds to the case, for example, when a group
of people download a malicious program at the same time,
or an attacker has programmed the replication to be time-
triggered. Since we have observed that betweenness based
node selection is not suited to patch spreading scheme, we
now focus on closeness based node selection only. To make
comparisons with the first containment scheme (Section
IV-D) we discuss result for the same malware start and
patch delay times. Similar trends were found for different
start times and other datasets. Figure 12 shows the effect
of starting a patch from an increasing number of initial
devices Np (increasing column left to right) as the number of
initially compromised devices Nm (reported on the x-axis)
is increased for the INFOCOM dataset.
First, in the case when a single initial patch message
(Np=1) is used (left panel), we observe that the AUC
corresponding to the scheme based on temporal centrality
is lower than that corresponding to the cases of static and
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Figure 12. INFOCOM: Effect of increasing number of initial devices
with malware (x-axis). From left to right, each column plots an increasing
number of devices from which a patch is started (tm=tp=Day 4 12am).
naive methods of node selection even as Nm increases;
the total containment time (τ ) remains below half a day
up to Nm=75% of the total number of nodes (which we
indicate with Ntot) and the peak compromised devices
(Imax) rises slowly as Nm increases. When increasing to
Np=10%Ntot, using temporal centrality the total contain-
ment time (Imax) drops below 2.5 hours (about 0.1 of a
day) up to Nm=75%Ntot. Only at Np=25%Ntot both the
naive and static methods start to match the performance of
the temporal method. These observations suggest that our
time-aware containment scheme using temporal centrality is
more accurate at ranking important nodes and hence a viable
option for a network operator since less devices are required
to receive a patching message in order to achieve an effective
containment strategy.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Related Work
The study of techniques for containing the spreading of
viruses and malware in the Internet has a long tradition (see a
recent survey by Li et al. [15]). However, traditional desktop
and server techniques for malware containment involve virus
scanners running on a computer; such a scheme is not
feasible on many mobile devices with limited resources.
More related to our work are so called “white-worms” which
propagate themselves in the same fashion as a malicious
worm over the Internet, however, such Internet schemes have
been documented as unsuccessful [25]. One reason for this
is the speed at which a malicious worm can spread over
the Internet relayed through computers and servers which
are switched on 24 hours a day and connected to high
speed networks; a white-worm has little chance of catching
up. Our results are positive because the basic assumption
of connectivity in human contact networks is different:
communication speed in mobile contact networks is not
limited only by bandwidth but by actual physical proximity.
As we have seen in Figure 4, a malicious mobile worm can
only spread during times of high human activity, for example
during the working day; this means that a mobile white-
worm does have time to catch up. Our time-aware scheme
adds on top of this a method for identifying the best devices
to start the patch.
More recently, social network based strategies for the
containment of mobile malware have been proposed. In
[26] Zhu et al. propose that the most central nodes derived
from phones call logs should be prioritised for patching.
However, this only captures potentially long-distance rela-
tionships and misses important opportunistic contacts that
Bluetooth worms can exploit. In [27] Zyba et al. evaluate
the spreading of a patch via short-range radio transmission;
this work is based on a random mobility model and assumes
homogeneous mixing and degree distribution over time. As
we have shown, mobile phone contact networks are driven
by periodic human schedules and so the models proposed in
this paper could be considered as an over-simplification of
real situations.
Such schemes are also partially founded on work on
the robustness to random failures and targeted attacks of
individual nodes in complex networks [5]: these solutions
are based on static graph representations which ignore time
ordering and frequency of contacts. Instead, this work has
shown that in real dynamic contact networks such schemes
only slow the spreading process and do not stop it.
B. Practical Implementation Issues
In the same way that decentralised opportunistic routing
protocols (such as BUBBLE Rap [12] and SimBet [7]) have
utilised predictability in human contact networks through so-
cial network analysis to predict node centrality, our ongoing
project will combine the time-aware malware containment
strategy presented in this study with such heuristic and
prediction techniques to identify the best devices to spread
a patch at different times of the day. Further, we shall inves-
tigate how such techniques can be enhanced by exploiting
rich temporal information in human contact networks such
as periodic behaviour [6] shown in Figure 4.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has motivated and investigated the effective-
ness of a time-aware mobile malware containment scheme
using temporal centrality to identify the best node to start
a competitive patch message. The evaluation on three real
human contact traces has shown that this time-aware scheme
can more consistently identify the best devices to start such a
patch across different malware start times and patch delays,
compared to static and random node identification.
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